Sony was supposed to win this. The company made magnetic tape out of like paper and mud back in the 1940s, turned out a “pocketable” transistor radio in the 1950s, and invented the “portable” television by 1960. They had their first video tape recorder by 1963. They weren’t the only ones, but they were among the first and best.

The so-called VTR business had a rocky start. The things were hulking bastards, with huge price tags and poor recording capability.

A company called Ampex put out the first “home entertainment” VTR in 1963, only it cost $US30,000 in the Neiman Marcus Christmas catalog, and was nicknamed Grant’s Tomb because the product manager who thought it up was going to be shoved inside by the company’s accountants. (He would have fit, too, the thing was so big.) Sony comes along in the middle of that decade and puts out a $US1,200 “portable” VTR that came with a leatherette case and its own TV. It still weighed 29 kilos.

The worst part about these 1960s VTRs was that they were basically reel-to-reel—you had to thread your own 1-inch videotape through spools and stuff, and by the end of the decade, a one-hour spool of tape was like 8 inches in diameter. Can you imagine your TiVo needing 180 spools of videotape to get the job done?

As Sony toiled on the videotape problem, Matsushita—who we now call Panasonic—and its independent subsidiary JVC weren’t really standing out in the VTR business. Let’s say this: Nobody would have guessed they’d be able to overthrow Sony and kick mecha arse within the decade.

However, these guys were among the biggest manufacturers, dwarfing Sony many times over. Matsushita, known for efficiency, not innovation, tended to focus on big boring appliances—TVs, refrigerators, air conditioners—with a smaller team, branded Technics, devoted to dominating the hi-fi realm. JVC was all about TVs and audio gear, and had decent video know-how.

It was Sony who solved the reel-to-reel problem with—ta daaa!—a video cassette. It was called U-Matic, and at 3/4″ thick, it was smaller than the earlier formats, but still a bit of a chunkster. Since video was a bit of a Wild West, Sony felt like it needed partners to firmly establish a format, and to avoid a format war. It asked Matsushita and JVC, who said “yes” as long as Sony adopted some changes. The key here: The partnership included a deal where everybody shared all the patents. Turns out, probably not the smartest move by Sony.

Sony was right to form a posse, though. Every single electronics maker in Japan, Europe and America was trying to build a video recorder. Some American firms were obsessed with lasers (though ironically it would later be the Dutch and Japanese firms who actually put lasers to good use); other American firms were jazzed about microfilm…for video. None of them had success. Before we get on with the story, here’s a list of totally failed video players and recorders:

• Matsushita VX-100 and VX-2000
• Matsushita AutoVision
• Toshiba/Sanyo V-Cord
• Ampex InstaVision
• MCA DiscoVision/Magnavox Magnavision
• CBS Electronic Video Recording
• RCA HoloTape
• Sears/Cartridge Television Cartrivision

See what I mean? A friggin’ mess it was.

Part of the problem was the message. Nobody knew what the hell this was all about. Sony wasn’t just a pioneer in the technology, they thought hard about how to explain why you totally desperately want something bad. At one point, Sony hired Bela Lugosi to dress up one last time as Dracula, and explain that, since he worked nights, he needed to catch up on primetime shows when he got home. Get it? Vampires—they’re out killing people when Barney Miller is playing! It was a good bit, and there were a lot more like it. Little by little, the public caught on to what VCRs were for.

Anyway, U-Matic, launched in 1971, wasn’t a runaway success, either, but it was the bestselling video recorder to date, and the first successful VCR. In the realm of pro video, it was hot. Sony cashed in by steering from the home market to the businesses but JVC, who kept trying to pitch it for home use, got hosed. Like villains in some Shakespearean play, Matsushita and JVC kinda lurked in the background, planning for the next round when they might one-up that little charmer, Sony. The name of their plot? Video Home System, which you and I call VHS.

Sony was naive. Like, crazy naive. In 1974, it asked Matsushita and JVC to partner up again, this time on a fully baked format called Betamax. They weren’t asking for intellectual collaboration, just a deal to make and sell the things. It was a nice system, with really small tapes, but the problem was, the tapes only recorded for an hour. Sony was like, “That’s not a problem,” but everyone else was like, “Yes, it is.” The would-be partners dragged their heels suspiciously, not signing any deals. Sony kinda thought that was weird, but went ahead and launched the one-hour Betamax box in 1975.

Big mistake.

Not long after Sony went into wide release with the one-hour Betamax, JVC pulled a two-hour VHS out of its butt. And in time for Christmas 1976 no less. Sony had another flash of naivete when it pressed on with the one-hour system for a while, even though it had a two-hour system in the works. In that gap, JVC and its big poppa Matsushita scored sales and recognition.

Some people say Betamax was “better” but that depends on many factors, and could very well be an urban myth. The technologies were so close Sony’s own chairman called VHS a copy of Betamax. What may have looked good in one system with certain settings might not look as good on another with different settings. And by some accounts, Betamax’s more moving parts meant they were more expensive to manufacture and more costly to maintain and repair. It’s not an open-and-shut case of quantity vs. quality. Either way you look at it, there are compromises.

By this point, it wasn’t just some anything-goes contest with a million formats. By 1976, all those above had died or were dying. In Japan, there were just two choices. The Japanese government told everyone to sort it out. Hitachi, Mitsubishi and Sharp joined Team VHS, but didn’t really move forward.

In February 1977, Sony grabbed Toshiba and Sanyo, and then signed the American powerhouse brand Zenith up for an order of Sony-made Betamaxes with the Zenith name on them. Was it going to happen for Betamax after all? Seemed like they’d finally drawn at least a few good cards from the deck.

Sony might not have been totally screwed at that moment, but there were two American powerhouses, and the other one, RCA, was undecided. Ironically, the fate of the Japanese VCR industry relied on how well it could handle the most American of sports: Football. In other words, now that both players could manage two hours of recording time, what RCA wanted was enough recording time to capture a game—three hours would do.

What transpired next is unclear. Even though, at the time, both technologies were limited to two-hour capacity, Matsushita pledged to make RCA tape machines that could record for four hours.

Was this a lie? Was it vapourware? Whatever the deal, JVC engineers pulled off a four-hour capacity six weeks later, and RCA agreed to buy 55,000 machines that year, and up to a million more in the next three years. Better yet, RCA’s SelectaVision VHS decks would cost $US300 less than the two-hour Betamaxes, at $US1000 a pop.

Although Betamax hung on for a bit longer, that, boys and girls, was the end of the competition. In 1979, Sony market share tilted downward, and by 1980, the jig was up for those poor bastards.

Note: I recognise that there are other issues that might have come into play here, including Universal’s lawsuit of Sony, which lead to today’s Supreme Court definition of fair-use copyright law, and the fact that some studios, including Warner, began squeezing movies onto videotape early, with varying degrees of success. However, I contend that none of that changed the outcome—the war above was fought between Sony and Matsushita, and Matsushita won.

SOURCES:
Fast Forward: Hollywood, The Japanese, and the VCR Wars – James Lardner (Special thanks to you, Jim, for chatting me through some of this)
Sony – John Nathan
The History of Television – Albert Abramson
Sony History – Sony Global Website
Made in Japan – Akio Morita
Quest for Prosperity – Konosuke Matsushita
[PDF] Case Report on Betamax – Verardi et al
“Why VHS was better than Betamax” – Guardian UK – Jack Schofield

Gizmodo ‘79 is a week-long celebration of gadgets and geekdom 30 years ago, as the analogue age gave way to the digital, and most of our favourite toys were just being born.

It’s pretty far down the road for any serious speculation, but rumours of an OLED-equipped iPod which would use less power by eliminating the backlight and offer better colour reproduction have been flying for a while. And the 2.5-inch size matches what’s currently found on the iPod classic, as well as the Zune 80. Autumn 2009 is a long way off, and these could just end up in one of many OLED-equipped phones or PMPs already out there, so don’t hold your breath on this one. [Bloomberg via Electronista]

March 20, 2008 News Release 08-027 Inv. No. 337-TA-640

ITC INSTITUTES SECTION 337 INVESTIGATION ON CERTAIN SHORT-WAVELENGTH LIGHT EMITTING DIODES, LASER DIODES AND PRODUCTS CONTAINING SAME

The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) has voted to institute an investigation of certain short-wavelength light emitting diodes, laser diodes, and products containing same. The products at issue in this investigation are short-wavelength (e.g., blue, violet) LEDs and laser diodes that are used in products such as hand-held mobile devices, instrument panels, billboards, traffic lights, HD DVD players (e.g., Blu-ray disc players), and data storage devices.

The investigation is based on a complaint filed by Gertrude Neumark Rothschild of Hartsdale, NY, on February 20, 2008. The complaint alleges violations of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 in the importation into the United States of certain short-wavelength light emitting diodes, laser diodes, and products containing same that infringe a patent owned by Rothschild. The complainant requests that the ITC issue exclusion orders and cease and desist orders.

The ITC has identified the following as respondents in this investigation:

Avago Technologies of Singapore;
Bacol Optoelectonic Co. Ltd. of Taiwan;
Dominant Semiconductors Sdn. Bhd. of Malaysia;
Everlight Electronics Co., Ltd., of Taiwan;
Exceed Perseverance Electronic Ind. Co., Ltd., of China;
Guangzhou Hongli Opto-Electronic Co., Ltd., of China;
Harvatek Internaional Inc. of Taiwan;
Hitachi, Ltd., of Japan;
Kingbright Electronic Co., Ltd., of Taiwan;
LG Electronics of Korea;
Lite-On Technology Corp. of Taiwan;
Lucky Light Electronics Co., Ltd., of China;
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., of Japan;
Motorola, Inc., of Schaumburg, IL;
Nokia of Finland;
Opto Tech Corporation of Taiwan;
Pioneer Corporation of Japan;
Rohm Co., Ltd., of Japan;
Samsung Group of Korea;
Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd., of Japan;
Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd., of Korea;
Sharp Corporation of Japan;
Shenzhen Unilight Electronic Co., Ltd., of China;
Shinano Kenshi Co., Ltd., of Japan;
Sony Corporation of Japan;
Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications AB of Sweden;
Stanley Electric Co., Ltd., of Japan;
Toshiba Corporation of Japan;
Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., of Malvern, PA; and
Yellow Stone Corporation of Taiwan.

By instituting this investigation (337-TA-640), the ITC has not yet made any decision on the merits of the case. The case will be referred to the Honorable Paul J. Luckern, an ITC administrative law judge, who will schedule and hold an evidentiary hearing. Judge Luckern will make an initial determination as to whether there is a violation of section 337; that initial determination is subject to review by the Commission.

The ITC will make a final determination in the investigation at the earliest practicable time. Within 45 days after institution of the investigation, the ITC will set a target date for completing the investigation. ITC remedial orders in section 337 cases are effective when issued and become final 60 days after issuance unless disapproved for policy reasons by the U.S. Trade Representative within that 60-day period.

[USITC via Reuters]

The mixed materials are bathed in titanium oxide (TiO2), jostled about by machinery to ensure an even distribution of the good stuff. The chemicals react to the plastics and other organics, generating tremendous heat. Water is used to maintain a 500°C temperature, ideal for the gasification. One by-product of the gasification of vinyl chloride is hydrogen chloride; that is “neutralised” with lime.

Panasonic doesn’t mention any other by-products. In fact, the company insists that the output consists of “harmless gases,” and that there are no “hazardous side-effects.” If this is all true, then maybe Panasonic should think about building a compact one for every kitchen in the world. What do you think? Ten years?

Press Release:

Panasonic Uses Catalytic Reaction to Decompose Plastics Into Harmless Gas for E-Waste Recycling

-Eliminating need for incinerating or dumping plastic waste in landfill-

Osaka, Japan – Panasonic, by which Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. is known, today announced that the company has developed together with Kusatsu Electric Co., Ltd. a recycling technology that enables the recovery of metals from plastic-coated wires and plastics used in electric and electronic equipment without causing hazardous side-effects.

Using the catalytic properties of titanium oxide (TiO2), the innovative technology facilitates recovery of inorganic substances such as metals by transforming organic substances such as plastics into harmless gases.

Panasonic is successfully using the new technology at the Matsushita Eco Technology Center (METEC) to recover copper from degaussing coils covered with vinyl chloride tape found in CRT TVs. In addition, mixed plastic waste destined for incineration or landfill is treated and changed into non-toxic gases at METEC. The method not only contributes to “zero waste,” but also helps reduce CO2 emissions as little external energy source is required in the gasification process.

Today, about 80 percent, by weight, of all collected home appliances is recycled into metallic and plastic materials. The remaining 20 percent is currently regarded as non-recyclable waste e.g. rubber, mixed glass and mixed plastic waste which is difficult to sort further as it is comprised of many different types of resins or contains metals. Although some mixed plastic waste can be used as fuel in general, the waste containing certain chemicals such as vinyl chloride needs to be treated in a high-temperature incinerator to avoid dioxin emissions.

The new recycling method combines Kusatsu Electric’s non-incineration plastic disposal technology using TiO2 and Panasonic’s high grade materials recovery technology that is used by Panasonic to recycle old home appliances. The method uses unique mixing and carrier systems that allow plastics to contact the catalyst efficiently for gasification, leaving the valuable metals. As the catalytic reaction of TiO2 generates heat to promote gasification, an additional heating source is not required in the process. The method uses cooling water to maintain temperature (500°C) for optimal catalytic reaction. The subsequent heated water from the process can be used for other purposes. Hydrogen chloride produced during the gasification process of vinyl chloride is neutralized with lime.

Panasonic aims to completely eliminate mixed plastic waste and spread the use of this environment-friendly technology to recycling-related facilities and further to production facilities in and out of the Panasonic group.